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1.1  Introduction 
The 1986 US.-Japan semiconductor trade agreement ranks among the most 
controversial trade policy actions of the 1980s. In this agreement the govern- 
ment of Japan agreed to end the “dumping” of semiconductors in world mar- 
kets (not just the United States) and to help secure 20 percent of their domestic 
semiconductor market for foreign producers within five years. 
The antidumping provisions-resulting  in part from the extraordinary self- 
initiation of  an antidumping action by the U.S. government-later  proved to 
be partly illegal under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
drew the  ire of  prominent high-technology,  semiconductor-using  industries, 
particularly  computer manufacturers. Computer producers formed a counter- 
vailing interest group to oppose these provisions and eventually forced them 
to be dropped in the 1991 renegotiation of the agreement. 
The 20 percent market share provision-an  exceptional  request from the 
standpoint  of  traditional  U.S.  trade  policy-was  the  negotiated  solution to 
the problem of market access in Japan based on circumstantial evidence that 
the market was closed to foreign semiconductor producers. These producers 
did achieve a 20.2 percent market share in Japan by the end of 1992, although 
the  share  has  subsequently  fluctuated.  But  by  concentrating  on  a  specific, 
quantitative “outcome” rather than the principle of market access, the provision 
provoked sharp debate: either it was heralded as a positive, concrete step to- 
ward  gaining  greater  sales  in  Japan  (“making  the  cash  registers  ring”)  or 
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scorned as a step toward cartelized “managed trade” and export protectionism 
via government-fixed market shares. 
Few industries ever receive the sustained, high-level attention needed to re- 
sult in the negotiation of a governmental agreement on trade in just one sector. 
This paper examines how the U.S. semiconductor industry became the benefi- 
ciary of  this unprecedented sectoral trade agreement.? 
1.2  The U.S. Semiconductor Industry 
The US. semiconductor  industry-a  prominent,  high-technology,  R&D- 
intensive industry-produced  $25 billion  in output with employment of just 
under 200,000 in  1989. 
1.2.1  Firms 
Firms range from the enormous-such  as IBM, the world’s largest semicon- 
ductor producer in the mid- 1980s-to  the minuscule-such  as Micron Tech- 
nology of Boise, Idaho, which specialized in memory chips. Although Micron’s 
sales were only 2/10 of  1 percent of IBM’s, both firms equally influenced the 
course of U.S. trade policy. Between these extremes lie a handful of prominent 
midsized firms that constitute the core of the U.S. industry: Texas Instruments 
(TI), Motorola, Advanced  Micro Devices (AMD), National  Semiconductor, 
and Intel. 
1.2.2  Products 
The 1980s trade dispute centered on a unique set of digital integrated cir- 
cuits-memory  chips-which  computers use to store and retrieve data and 
which accounted for 18 percent of all U.S. semiconductor purchases in 1985. 
Dynamic random-access memories (DRAMS)  comprised 7 percent of the total 
market. The DRAM market approaches perfect competition because DRAMs 
are a standardized commodity produced by many firms3 
1.2.3  Capital and Labor 
In  1977 corporate executives,  the principal  capital owners in the industry 
(many firms were still dominated by  their founders), formed the Semiconduc- 
tor Industry Association (SIA) to lobby for trade actions. Some firms organized 
political  action committees, whose disbursements appear related to the trade 
1. The Clinton administration has promised to use import targets with Japan in other scctors. 
For a critical analysis, see Irwin (1994). 
2. This paper is a significantly condensed version of my longer paper of the same title issued as 
NBER Working Paper no. 4745, May  1994. The longer version should be consulted  for fuller 
details of this issue. 
3.  The industry is often thought to be a strategic industry because of learning spillovers. For an 
assessment, see Irwin and Klenow (1994). 7  The US.-Japan Semiconductor Trade Conflict 
dispute with Japan.4 With one-third of U.S. semiconductor employment in Cal- 
ifornia, the SIA ably employed  California’s congressional representatives  to 
pressure the executive branch into trade action. 
Labor itself was largely mute. The lack of political activism among workers 
could be attributed to their interindustry mobility: evidence suggests that many 
of them have skills useful in related high-technology  ind~stries.~ 
1.2.4  Merchants and Captives 
Captive producers, such as IBM and AT&T, are vertically integrated (mak- 
ing semiconductors for internal consumption) but are net purchasers of semi- 
conductors from others. Merchant firms produce semiconductors for sale to 
other firms. Merchant firms have an  interest in high  semiconductor  prices, 
whereas captive producers do not. These conflicting interests within the SIA 
had to partially accommodate each other. 
1.2.5  Downstream Users 
Computer manufacturers are the most important domestic users of memory 
chips and could be expected to oppose proposals that would raise semiconduc- 
tor prices. These manufacturers did not initially oppose the  1986 agreement, 
but did so with the subsequent rise in DRAM prices. 
1.2.6  Japanese Producers 
Japanese lobbying during the antidumping and Section 301 (of the Trade 
Act of  1974) deliberations was limited because of the strict administrative pro- 
cedures under U.S. trade law. The Electronic Industries Association  of Japan 
(EIAJ) and its members spent $3.8 million on K Street lawyers for their legal 
defense between 1985 and 1987.6 
1.3  Semiconductor Competition from Japan 
Japan emerged  as a major producer of  semiconductors in the late  1970s. 
Spectacular  success was achieved in DRAMS: the U.S.  market share plum- 
meted from 70 to 20 percent between  1978 and  1986 as the Japanese share 
jumped from under 30 to about 75 percent.’ Import penetration increased. Ja- 
pan’s share of total U.S. semiconductor consumption rose from 7.5 percent in 
1982 to 12.3 percent in 1984, before dropping back to 9.8 percent in 1986. Yet 
4. According to the Federal Election Commission, payments totaled $354,3  18 at the peak of the 
5. See Ong and Mar (1992). 
6. Roughly $1 ,I million over these three years was devoted to countering the Section 301 action, 
comparable to that spent by  the SIA alone on the Section 301 case. Figures from the Department 
of Justice. 
dispute in  1985 and 1986.40 percent higher than in 1983 and 1984. 
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Japan’s share of the U.S. market was not fully indicative of the force of the new 
competition because, in an integrated world market, Japanese producers could 
capture market share abroad only by forcing the market price downward every- 
where. 
Why were Japanese firms so successful? The role of the Ministry of Intema- 
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) and industrial policy has been wholly exag- 
gerated by  those sympathetic to the  semiconductor industry. Japanese firms 
probably had easier access to capital: they are often affiliated with a large bank 
that could play a role in corporate governance through equity ownership (the 
Glass-Steagall Act prohibits  such activities in the United States). Such bank 
ties probably allowed Japanese producers to weather industry downturns much 
better than their U.S. counterparts.* On the U.S. side, the high cost of capital 
in the early 1980s, the appreciation of the U.S. dollar, lagging adoption of new 
process technology, and quality control problems all hampered U.S. firms. 
1.4  Trade Action against Japan 
market access. 
1.4.1  Dumping 
The dumping complaints arose during the periodic sharp price declines in 
this cyclically volatile industry. The industry recession of  1985 was extremely 
severe because of a brief slowdown in the computer market. After increasing 
by a factor of five between 1981 and 1984, domestic shipments of microcom- 
puters actually fell by 8 percent in 1985. 
Prices collapsed and the memory-chip market contracted 60 percent. Mer- 
chant firms racked up unprecedented losses. Capacity utilization and employ- 
ment plummeted. Every U.S. merchant producer was pushed out of the DRAM 
market except Texas Instruments and Mi~ron.~ 
Despite complaints that dumping was “predatory”  and “unfair,” Japan did 
not pick 1985 as the year to drive U.S. firms out of business. Indeed, Japanese 
firms experienced similar losses and layoffs as world demand fell. Imports did 
not cause the recession: Japanese import penetration actually fell in the two 
years after 1984. Three-quarters of the fall in revenues of US.-based compa- 
nies in 1985 were due to declining overall demand, only a quarter due to lost 
market share.’O 
Regardless of the underlying economics, the antidumping laws were always 
available. Captive producers opposed higher tariffs on semiconductors and pre- 
vented the SIA from ever filing an antidumping complaint. A small firm that 
SIA members had two complaints about their foreign rivals: dumping and 
8. See Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990). 
9. Most firms simply abandoned DRAM production and concentrated on other product lines, 
10. Federal Interagency Staff Working Group (1987, 10). 
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at the time was not even a member of the SIA forced the issue. In June 1985, 
Micron  filed an  antidumping  complaint  against  Japanese exporters of  64K 
DRAMs. Merchant SIA members soon broke ranks: in September 1985, Jntel, 
AMD, and National  Semiconductor filed for antidumping action against im- 
ports of erasable programmable read-only memories (EPROMs) from Japan.” 
In an unusual move, the Commerce Department self-initiated an antidumping 
case on 256K and future generations of DRAMs in December 1985. 
As the petitions ground through the administrative trade bureaucracy, pre- 
liminary determinations from the International Trade Commission indicated 
support for the industry, and final affirmative findings appeared to be inevi- 
table. 
1.4.2  Market Access 
An important barrier to the sale of foreign semiconductors in Japan was the 
high degree of vertical integration there (that is, captive production, like IBM 
and AT&T).  l2  Few governmental barriers remained after Japan formally liber- 
alized its semiconductor trade in 1975. The SIA viewed this as a sham because 
the U.S. share of the Japanese market scarcely budged. 
In  June  1985, the SIA filed a Section 301 petition with the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR), providing circumstantial evidence 
of market barriers  in Japan. In  1984, U.S. producers accounted for over 83 
percent of sales in the United States, 55 percent in Europe, 47 percent in else- 
where, yet just 11 percent in Japan. But they had no smoking gun: the strongest 
statement the SIA could muster was that “these trade [market share] figures, 
coupled with Japan’s protectionist heritage in microelectronics, strongly sug- 
gests that market barriers still exist in Japan.”  The SIA demanded “affirma- 
tive action” in the Japanese market. 
Coincidentally, the SIA’s political timing was superb. Unlike in 1982, when 
a trial Section 301 petition was shot down by USTR William Brock, the mas- 
sive trade deficit focused the Reagan administration’s attention on such matters. 
The USTR self-initiated Section 301 cases to divert protectionist pressure from 
closing the U.S. market to opening up foreign markets. The audience for this 
“tough” trade policy was Congress.14  With this political backdrop, the SIAs 
petition was attractive in many respects: it was in line with the administration’s 
emerging stress on opening foreign markets, did not directly advocate closing 
the US. market, and would help mollify congressional critics who wanted a 
tougher Japan policy. 
11. Notably absent from this list was Texas Instruments, the largest U.S.  producer of  EPROMs 
12. Japanese firms also tended to specialize in certain types of semiconductors and trade these 
13. SIA and Dewey Ballantine (1984, 2). emphasis added. 
14. The administration desperately sought to avoid a congressional trade bill forcing the presi- 
dent to impose sanctions against countries running a trade surplus with the United States. For a 
discussion of the political environment of trade policy in the mid-1980s. see Destler (1992). 
with direct investments in Japan. 
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But any petition guaranteed to generate a major confrontation  with Japan 
would  encounter  some opposition  within  the administration. The SIA made 
vague  claims about how  Japan’s  government  fostered  “Buy Japan”  attitudes 
and identified Japan’s market structure (reciprocal trading relationships among 
firms) as a trade barrier. But what were the explicit government policies that 
were actionable under Section 301? To some administration officials, past gov- 
ernment  policies,  vertical  integration,  and  long-term  relationships  hardly 
seemed to constitute actionable “unfair trade practices.” 
As for the widely distributed SIA pie charts showing country shares in re- 
gional markets, an alternative hypothesis was consistent with no Japanese “un- 
fair” practices: U.S. producers dominated the U.S. market, Japanese producers 
dominated the Japanese market, and U.S. producers essentially split other mar- 
kets with other producers, holding a slightly higher share in Europe owing to 
long-standing direct investments in Europe behind the tariff barrier that kept 
out Japanese imports. Japanese access to the U.S.  market also may have been 
hindered by discrimination in the distribution system.I5 
But there being no major opponents to the petition, the USTR initiated the 
Section 301 case against Japan. 
1.5  The Semiconductor Trade Agreement of  1986 
With the exception of Micron, virtually no party had an interest in seeing 
the antidumping duties imposed. For captive producers and downstream users, 
the U.S. market would become a “high-priced island.” For merchants, the anti- 
dumping remedy alone would still permit Japanese dumping in third markets 
and kill U.S. sales there. For the Japanese producers,  a voluntary export re- 
straint to capture scarcity rents would be preferable to antidumping duties. All 
forces were driving toward a negotiated settlement before the antidumping du- 
ties went into effect. 
The negotiations  got  stuck on third-country  dumping and market  access. 
Japan wanted to hedge on both points. The SIA was adamant. Japan capitulated 
to avoid the automatic imposition of antidumping penalties and possible 301 
sanctions. In doing so, the EIAJ felt abandoned by MITI, perhaps accounting 
for its later reluctance to adhere to guidelines enforcing the agreement. 
Japan agreed to take actions that would end dumping in the United States.16 
The agreement on preventing third-market dumping was more vague and the 
15. U.S. semiconductor firms limited Japanese access by terminating contracts with distributors 
who agreed to carry Japanese products. Japanese semiconductor firms had only one nationwide 
distributor in the United States (Marshall Industries) because of the “unspoken ban on Japanese 
franchises” and the “dictum that large houses will not take on the Japanese so long as they are 
supported by domestic suppliers,” See Elecrronic News. 9 December 1985, S28. 
16. The Department of Commerce would determine company-specific price floors each quarter 
and convey this information to the Japanese firms. 11  The U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Trade Conflict 
government’s obligation less clear. On market access, the agreement exhorted 
Japanese producers to create more sales opportunities for others. But a secret 
side-letter explicitly but ambiguously mentioned the 20 percent market share: 
“the Government of Japan recognizes the U.S. semiconductor industry’s expec- 
tation” that sales will rise to “slightly above 20 percent” in five years and that 
“the Government of Japan considers that this can be realized.” 
What policy measures and instruments did Japan have, beyond mere exhor- 
tation, to enforce the  agreement  and  guarantee  that Japanese  firms did not 
dump in the world market and bought the requisite amount of  foreign-made 
chips? Implementation, quite mistakenly, was not viewed as a major concern 
for US. negotiators, but it was a real problem for Japan since they did not 
directly control the industry. 
To  prevent worldwide dumping, MITI did the only thing it knew how to 
do-reduce  the quantity of  semiconductors exported to raise export prices. 
MITI  essentially  imposed  an  “antidumping”  voluntary  export  restraint 
(VER)-an  export restraint designed to meet a price target rather than a quan- 
titative target.  MITI issued directives  to reduce output but had no statutory 
authority to force any firm to comply and indeed had difficulty in getting firms 
to comply.” On market access, MITI undertook surveys of firms’s purchasing 
plans  and  encouraged  greater  purchases  of  foreign  semiconductors.  Once 
again, they had no direct policy instrument to enforce the provisions and com- 
pliance was initially weak. 
MITI’s inability to bring Japanese firms quickly in line looked like waffling 
to the SIA and the administration. Fearing Capitol Hill’s reaction to another 
“failed” trade agreement with Japan, President Reagan imposed  100 percent 
tariffs on $300 million worth of Japanese imports in April 1987. The retaliation 
ranks among the most dramatic events of postwar U.S. trade policy. Japan was 
stunned, but some reports indicated that MITI was secretly pleased because it 
proved to Japanese firms that they should follow MITI’s directives. 
1.6  Economic Effects of the 1986 Agreement 
As with  other VERs,  the  beneficiaries  included  Japanese  exporters.  The 
MITI-induced  production  cutbacks generated  an enormous windfall  for ex- 
porters. According to some reports, profits on 1M DRAM sales for Japanese 
producers amounted to $1.2 billion in 1988 alone, which could be plowed back 
into R&D and product upgrading. Higher DRAM prices accelerated the entry 
of South Korean firms not covered by the restraint. 
Only two U.S.  merchant firms (TI and Micron) remained in the DRAM mar- 
ket to benefit from the antidumping actions. DRAM sales reportedly accounted 
17. However,  bureaucratic delays  in  approval  of  export licenses-also  tightened to  prevent 
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for as much as 60 percent of TI’S profits in  1988 and Micron’s sales rose by  a 
factor of  six between  1986 and  1988.Ix US. producers  did  not  reenter  the 
DRAM  market.  Motorola  agreed to buy  prefabricated  semiconductor  dies 
from Toshiba, assemble them in Malaysia, and import them under Motorola’s 
name to avoid the antidumping duties. U.S. Memories, a consortium to estab- 
lish greater domestic DRAM production, was stillborn. 
The clear losers from the agreement were semiconductor users, particularly 
computer manufacturers dependent on DRAMS.  They soon fought back. 
1.7  Aftermath of the 1986 Agreement 
Of the three major provisions of the  1986 agreement, only one (on market 
access) survived through the renegotiation of the agreement in 1991. 
The third-market  dumping provision  died in  1988. Responding to a com- 
plaint from the European Community, a GATT panel ruled that Japanese moni- 
toring  of  export  prices  on  third-market  sales  violated  Article  11  of  the 
Agreement. 
The U.S.  dumping provision  died with the new  1991 agreement.  When 
semiconductor  demand picked up again, U.S. DRAM prices soared and proved 
so costly to purchasers  that they  ended the SIRS monopoly  as the USTR’s 
adviser on semiconductor trade policy. IBM, Tandem, and Hewlett-Packard led 
others in founding the Computer Systems Policy Project  (CSPP) in  1989 to 
oppose the antidumping measures. The USTR could not possibly negotiate a 
satisfactory  agreement  in the face of  sharply conflicting domestic  interests. 
Rather than mediate, the USTR instructed  the SIA and the CSPP to resolve 
their differences. 
The SIA and the CSPP declared the antidumping  provisions a “success.” 
The CSPP was indifferent to the market access provisions so long as there were 
no sanctions for noncompliance. The 1991 accord extended by one year (to the 
end of  1992) the deadline for meeting the target, while stating that the target 
“constitute[s] neither a guarantee, a ceiling, nor a floor on the foreign market 
share  .” 
Contrary  to virtually  all expectations,  the foreign  market  share in Japan 
reached  20.2 percent  in the fourth quarter of  1992. MITI pressure on other 
purchasers and a greater presence in Japan by U.S. firms probably accounted 
for the increase in U.S.  market share. There is little evidence that the changing 
composition of Japanese demand (toward products the United States was better 
at producing, like microprocessors) did the trick.I9 
18. The employment effects of the agreement were probably  negligible:  back-of-the-envelope 
calculations suggest increased semiconductor employment of 2,300, but for each of these another 
was lost in computer manufacturing. 
19. See Bergsten and Noland (1993. 136). 13  The U.S.-Japan  Semiconductor Trade Conflict 
1.8  Conclusions 
Those guilty of post hoc, ergo propter hoc reasoning attribute the rebound 
in the U.S. semiconductor industry since the mid-1980s to the agreement. The 
agreement did spawn greater cooperation and joint ventures between SIA and 
EIAJ  members. But the  U.S. industry  did well to get out of  memory chips 
(where the Japanese are now battling the South Koreans) and into microproces- 
sors and application-specific integrated circuits. The agreement had little to do 
with this. 
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